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Abstract
Exemplified especially by Heidegger and Levinas, the phenomenology of 
death expresses first, the impossibility of the death experience, second, the 
authenticity of Dasein starting from the horizon opened by the possibility 
of death, and third, the relevance of the death of the other to the discovery 
of one’s own death. This article tries to take a step further, showing the link 
between the authenticity of Dasein and the desire for immortality manifested 
in this authenticity. By overturning Heidegger’s theses and by affirming both 
the necessity of an authentication of death itself—in accord with Socrates’s 
death example—and the legitimacy of the meditation on death, this text 
links the need for immortality, which is phenomenologically visible, with the 
Christian faith in the resurrection, which is visible only for theology.
Keywords: memento mori, Phenomenology of Death, Martin Heidegger, 
Emmanuel Levinas, Christian Revelation, Resurrection of Christ
The Threat of Forgotten Death
Living one’s everyday life means to forget death, an attitude only appar-ently similar to a phenomenological reduction that would effortlessly 
put into brackets the existence of the funeral event. It is a false reduction, 
because it does not seek to highlight the reduced phenomenon, as it hap-
pens with the Husserlian transcendental-phenomenological reduction. 
Intentionality avoids death and leads obsessively to life. We often live the 
equivalent of a life without death in this world, in existential ignorance, 
from which only suffering, as a finitude experienced in our own body or 
in our own soul, takes us out episodically. In the first instance, we lose our 
death, as we lose ourselves in the world. Without warnings of suffering, 
we are always too young to die.
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Death does not concern us, said Epicurus, because as long as we exist 
there is no death, and when death comes, we no longer exist. To eliminate 
the fear of death that causes unhappiness, his materialism divided the entire 
human experience into a life without death and a death without life. When 
man does not forget death, he keeps it at a distance, at the greatest possible 
distance, that is, at the distance of the possible itself. This is a false distance, 
of course, because death can cover and suspend it in an instant. Heidegger 
teaches us that, from an existential point of view, “death must be grasped 
as the ownmost nonrelational, certain possibility not-to-be-bypassed.”1 But 
whenever it happens in the death of our neighbor, it shudders the order of 
life and occurs as a radical strangeness. Man had offered to death neither 
place nor time and had pushed it beyond the horizon of life; still death 
comes from nowhere and even announced, it comes from never, thus having 
the characteristics of nothingness. The nothingness of death has contradic-
tory relations with the being, and no dialectical transition will undermine 
the radical difference between being and not being. The irreversibility of 
death is scandalous and unnatural.
Our own death is more than the artistic horizon of life that can give 
greatness to our acts and loves, and its discovery takes place with the death 
of our beloved. Any analogy between their death and my death remains 
imperfect, lost in the insurmountable fracture between being and non-being. 
The analogical representation of my death takes place on the firm ground of 
being still alive, so it does not really become an experience of my death. In 
fact, reducing death to an experience is a phenomenological impossibility2, 
and it is not inappropriate to consider that we do not really experience our 
death in the death of the other: “We do not experience the dying of others 
in a genuine sense; we are at best always just ‘there’ too.”3 “No one can take 
the other’s dying away from him.”4 
In the death of the loved one, we experience the horror of the decom-
position of the remaining corpse, but also its absolute indifference that 
sometimes shows an unearthly serenity. Faced with their loss and definitive 
absence, we experience acute suffering and nonsense, if “death cannot be 
dominated by thought.”5 Besides the ontological contradiction between 
being and nothing there is also the existential fact that it is not about death 
in general, but about one’s own death.
1  Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, ed. Dennis J. Schmidt, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Suny 
Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1996), 238 [258].
2  Emmanuel Lévinas, God, death, and time (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
2000), 10.
3  Heidegger, Being and Time, 222 [239].
4  Heidegger, Being and Time, 223 [240].
5  Françoise Dastur, Moartea: eseu despre finitudine [Death: An Essay on Finitude], trans. 
Sabin Borș (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2006), 9. 
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This detail reveals the anxiety in the face of one’s own death, an anxiety 
that transfers death from the abstract being—nothingness relationship to 
an existential horizon.
Death, such is it is appears, concerns and frightens and causes 
anxiety in the death of an other, is an annihilation that does 
not find its place in the logic of being and nothingness. It is an 
annihilation that is a scandal and to which moral notions such 
as responsibility do not come to be simply added on.6 
Because now, faced with the lost one, the threat of the unbeatable has 
become visible, along with the danger in front of which one can do nothing. 
“In death I am exposed to absolute violence, to murder in the night.”7 Like any 
revelation, the revelation of death is made without our will. We can always 
return to oblivion—and it often happens after the labor of mourning—but the 
dark light of a troubling truth that we did not consider before now continues 
to flicker in our soul. We are in a war that we have not chosen and that we 
will surely lose, in the face of an unpredictable and transcendent enemy about 
which we know absolutely nothing. At the disposal of the imminence, man is 
“the shortest way between life and death.”8 Born on the battlefield, without 
the hope of peace, we can only practice our lives in an armistice. 
We can return to the entertainment and drunkenness of living or even 
invent a philosophy of laughter, following the discovery of death;9 but we 
cannot ignore forever the certainty of our own end, the fact that we are 
“toward death” (Sein zum Tode)10, that “The only future that is necessarily 
mine is my death.”11 Hegel’s words—that the life of the Spirit must be truly 
gained precisely by dwelling in absolute rupture, enduring death and yet 
being preserved without destruction—are valid for a God-man, therefore 
inconsolable at this moment.12 For in our case, in the death of our neighbor, 
a declaration of war was addressed to us, which does not disappear with its 
ignorance. The definitive absence of the other has revealed the inescapable 
presence of one’s own end which, possibility and certainty alike, raises, 
between the instinctual desire of extinction and the anxiety of the future 
adjudicated by death, the decisive question on the meaning of one’s own 
life. Recognized or not, this question engages the search for immortality.
6  Lévinas, God, death, and time, 78.
7  Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), 233.
8  Emil Cioran, Amurgul gândurilor [The Twilight of Thoughts] (Bucharest: Humanitas, 
1991), 77.
9  See for such a philosophy Dastur, Death: An Essay on Finitude.
10  Being toward death is analyzed by Heidegger in Being and Time, chapters 46–53.
11  Jean-Yves Lacoste, Note sur le temps: Essai sur les raisons de la mémoire et de l’espérance 
(Paris: PUF, 1990), chap. 12.
12  See G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), 19 (par. 32). 
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In Search of Immortality:  
Authenticity, Vanity, Love
We will interpret Heidegger by setting out from the idea that the authen-
ticity that Dasein acquires starting from its own possibility coming from the 
future is precisely a form of immortality. The constant unfulfillment that 
defines the human being forbids its understanding as an integrity without 
rest. On this side of his death, man remains engaged in his future, self-pro-
jected “before-himself.” The existential concept of death shows that Dasein 
is a being-toward-death, thus open to this possibility:
First of all, we must characterize being-toward-death as a being 
toward a possibility, toward an eminent possibility of Da-sein 
itself. Being toward a possibility, that is, toward something 
possible, can mean to be out for something possible, as in taking 
care of its actualization.13
Heidegger says that actualization does not mean trying to actualize one’s 
own death by provoking it or by the constant thought of death. The latter, 
which interests us here, loses sight of the very possibility of death as such:
Brooding over death does not completely take away from it its 
character of possibility. It is always brooded over as something 
coming, but we weaken it by calculating how to have it at our 
disposal.14
But death is possibility of no longer being, “the possibility of the impos-
sibility of existence in general”.15 In its light, man can be himself authenti-
cally, that is, he can try to actualize his life project, evading the “They” 
(das Man).
Heidegger does not link the authenticity of Dasein with immortality. 
Conditioned by the freedom that the consciousness of the possibility of 
death brings, the authenticity is to the measure of each man; it is his life 
project unaffected by the impersonal opinions that society conveys. But this 
freedom is not exercised in an absent context, it is not given without a world, 
without the possibility for another to recognize this authenticity. As Pascal 
had already written, vanity motivates our noblest and, we might add, most 
authentic acts. Although Heidegger excludes others from the work of my 
authenticity, as if it were only me and my death in question, the fame that—
discreetly or visibly, excluded or insistently sought—accompanies the exer-
cises of authenticity offers a first form of immortality. There is no sufficient 
13  Heidegger, Being and Time, 241 [261].
14  Heidegger, Being and Time, 241 [261].
15  Heidegger, Being and Time, 242 [262].
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reason to consider authenticity as free from vanity. To be authentic means 
to be authentic for another consciousness, at least one, real or imagined, 
for a minimal gallery contemporary to me or imagined as posterity. Even 
just as a spectator, the other motivates the work of being myself. Escaping 
from the captivity of the “They,” it is no less true that Dasein searches for 
another “They,” delivering itself to a more intelligent posterity, to a loving 
or at least understanding otherness.
Or this self-giving means self-phenomenalization and bestows a form 
of my immortality in the consciousness of the other. By exercising his 
authenticity, man is not only caught in his magnificent freedom offered by 
the consciousness of death. The sphere of the ego explodes in search of a 
self-delivery to an otherness.
I am only if I am for someone. Esse est percipi, as Berkeley said, a principle 
that, reformulated, would now sound: to be authentic means to be perceived 
as authentic. “Relative immortality”16 is part of Dasein’s existential project 
and has only one need: the other.
In order to measure our own authenticity from the perspective of the 
other’s gaze, we will discuss only the maximum situation in which the 
other is the loved one. Certainly, the other does not change or interfere 
with the horizon opened by the possibility of my own death; but they 
constitute the necessary gallery in front of which I exercise my authentic-
ity, even if the details of this exercise are unknown to them. However, it 
is not an exceptional fact that love captures death and changes the course 
of authenticity, transforming it into an authenticity of love. Putting your 
own life at stake to win the love of another is not uncommon, because 
love “is as strong as death” (Song of Songs 8: 6). Death gives authen-
ticity to love, by certifying it; death takes on less radical forms at first, 
such as self-denial, advancement, love unconditioned by the reciprocity 
of the answer,17 but it can reach the ultimate sacrifice, giving love the 
immortality that, incomprehensibly, love seems to hold anyway. This 
sketch reveals the force with which death authenticates love, and the 
most eloquent example is that of the crucifixion of the Son of God out 
of love for men. Even if theology sees here a gift, through death, of the 
resurrection itself, philosophy can notice that the relationship between 
death and love, as announced in the Gospels, is at the same time one of 
authentication. 
16  Peter Sloterdijk differentiates the “relative immortality” of moderns from both the 
immortality of the Egyptian pharaoh and the Christian immortality of all who believe. See 
Peter Sloterdijk, Derrida, an Egyptian. On the Problem of the Jewish Pyramid, trans. Wieland 
Hoban (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 66. 
17  See the phenomenology of love in Jean-Luc Marion, Le phénomène érotique (Paris: 
Grasset, 2003); a comment can be found in Nicolae Turcan, Apologia după sfârșitul metafizicii. 
Teologie și fenomenologie la Jean-Luc Marion [Apology after the End of Metaphysics: Theology 
and Phenomenology in Jean-Luc Marion], (Bucharest: Eikon, 2016), 319–38.
The Meditation on Death  
and the Theology of the Resurrection
We should ask ourselves if there is an authenticity of death, and not just 
one of Dasein. According to Heidegger, the authentic existence becomes 
possible in the horizon opened by the possibility of one’s own death. But 
is death itself devoid of relief and nobility, or in other words, can it be 
anyway? Isn’t the authenticity of living also considering an authenticity of 
one’s own death? Isn’t something of the inaccessible possible still imagined 
by meditation, letting itself be caught in the work of authenticity? “The 
platonic doctrine of the superiority of philosophy over death”18 provides 
the answer, as follows from the example of Socrates: in Phaido, the pre-
occupation with philosophy is a “training for dying,”19 as if the work of 
authenticity extended to include death. Not only does the horizon of death 
give authenticity to life, but also the life lived in the horizon of philosophy 
(or theology, we might add) gives authenticity to death. One could object 
that Socrates built his arguments already having in the background the 
belief in immortality, faith in the absence of which his arguments would be 
unconvincing. But how do the relative immortality of vanity, gained in the 
eyes of posterity—which may never take place for various reasons—and 
religious immortality differ phenomenologically? Both have to do with 
the invisible and—when the legitimacy of religious faith is not taken into 
account—with the illusion, even if posterity seems to have more justified 
chances of actualization, if we discuss only on the horizon of this world. 
But both have the power to project in the present, through the possibility 
of death, the free decision for the labor of authenticity. Therefore, Socrates 
prepares his authentic death by his philosophical life, doubled by the faith 
in a future life—although Phaidon does not separate them. Thinking of 
immortality as a basis, death itself gains authenticity through the nobility of 
its acceptance. We will therefore have to overturn Heidegger’s view of the 
purest possibility and the refusal of the thought of death into an imperfectly 
actualized possibility through meditation. Memento mori is a way to give 
authenticity not only to life but also to one’s own death.
It is not a novelty: the thought of death does not change the status of 
the possibility of death, but it realizes its inevitability and certainty. It is 
no less an experience of an absent phenomenon, an experience of absence. 
Although meditation on death does not offer death itself, we must concede 
that it still offers the only imaginable form of our own death. Imagining 
the ultimate loss of self, announced by the significant losses from our life 
18  Paul Louis Landsberg, The Experience of Death and the Moral Problem of Suicide, trans. 
Edouard d’Arraille (London: Living Time Press, 2008), 36.
19  Plato, Phaedo, in Complete Works, trans. G.M.A. Grube, ed. John M. Cooper and D.S. 
Hutchinson (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 67 e.
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or by asceticism, is close enough to death as to  deliver us to an experience 
of anguish or reconciliation. We can make an analogy between the thought 
of death and death without claiming to annihilate the unknown and the 
strangeness of death itself. The more intensely one practices this experience 
of meditation on death, the closer this pure and certain possibility comes to 
consciousness, without canceling the ever-present distance between oneself 
and one’s empirical death. The experience of dying through meditation on 
death can be an experience of debilitating life and its projects; but it can also 
be one of understanding one’s own finitude, one of wisdom.
Meditation on one’s own death offers an imagined phenomenon that, 
through the absolute incomprehension and absurdity it puts into play, 
contradicts life.
What the human person brings in the face of the possibility of death, 
beyond the achievements of authenticity, is also the feeling of its impossibility 
in the horizon of life. The death of the neighbor gives itself as a phenomenon 
on a stage, in the distance of intentionality. But the life that inhabits me with 
its richness forbids death until the last moment. My love for someone forbids 
death forever. A phenomenology of life, as Michel Henry built, insists on 
its distance from the phenomenology of intentionality and of the world.20 
From the perspective of such a phenomenology of life, the sentiment of 
its de jure impossibility accompanies the nonsense of death. And there is 
no need to contend with Henry the identity between our life and God’s life 
in us. Even remaining on the horizon of non-religious life, the absurdity 
of death does not mean the removal of the attempt to find a solution. It is 
as if man were an immortal being, before a life accident that should not or 
could not annihilate life. In this as if—understood as the experience of the 
wholeness of life—man builds his religions21 and his forms of immortality. 
Once a “preparation for death”, philosophy, with a few notable exceptions, 
no longer has a grasp on the funeral phenomenon, always remaining outside 
of it. But rejecting the meditation on death means to disregard what man 
has always known, that memento mori leads to perfection, no matter how 
this perfection is understood: as the authenticity of Dasein, as wisdom, or 
as holiness.
The thought of death is a repetition of finitude, in order to open to infin-
ity, be it just a desire for the absolute. Man’s need for the absolute remains 
insatiable, abysmal and has a contiguity with death that must be taken into 
account. With death one can enter philosophy, but one can just as well get 
out of it, towards theology, understood as a religious life. The search for the 
20  See the first chapter about overturning phenomenology in Michel Henry, Incarnation. 
Une philosophie de la chair (Paris: Seuil, 2000), §1–§15.
21  In his book Against Religion, Christos Yannaras states that except for Christianity, which 
is revealed by God, other religions are creations of the religiosity of man, of the instinctive 
need to survive. Christos Yannaras, Against Religion. The Alienation of the Ecclesial Event, 
trans. Norman Russel (Brookline, Massachusetts: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2013), 1–20.
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absolute can lead to the creation of gods more or less paradoxical, more or 
less close to the image of the revealed God.22 Theoretical answers, always 
deficient here, do not satisfy this search in front of death; only a perfect life 
could respond to such nonsense, and only a call from God could account 
for the desperate measure of our calls. Yet, the only plausible answer to 
the nonsense of death is faith in eternal life and resurrection, but it already 
belongs to revealed religion and theology.
Theology is the only one that can speak meaningfully about resurrection, 
it is “the only one that knows positively, and states equally, that death has no 
and is not the last word.”23 Its approach engages God’s revelation and faith 
in what one cannot yet see. It responds to us through a leap into God, like 
a leap into the void, which transcends death, our world, and biological life 
alike. Theology teaches us that our form is the absolute, that our openness is 
the absolute. Faced with death, Christian revelation affirms the joy of being 
more than beings on the horizon of this world. Let’s face it: it is not at all 
inappropriate with our deepest feelings, our need for immortality. Eternal 
life, brought by Christ through His resurrection, is to man more natural, 
less absurd, infinitely less strange than death. If death is transcendent to life, 
it is no less true that we can think of faith as transcendent to death. Faith 
“passes not only beyond but also on this side of death”;24 it makes the contact 
between life and life, between life here and eternal life, with death as the 
medium term. Through faith, the meditation on death no longer weakens, 
but rejoices in the light that comes from the afterlife. Eschatological hope 
not only weakens death, but defeats it to a certain extent, as much as a pos-
sibility given by faith can defeat the phenomenological certitude of death. 
We are still in the world, and if death is still here despite faith, this situation 
emphasizes the exceptional gravity of this life. Death offers the horizon of 
our authenticity and, through its transcendence, demands the opening to 
an eschatological future. Phenomenology and theology. Why should we be 
surprised? The need for immortality that accompanies us even in our daily 
acts, often loaded with an absolute unsuitable to them, accompanied by the 
thought of death and the belief in the resurrection of the Son of God offers 
a religious experience that transcends death. Of course, we are no longer in 
phenomenology. But the repetition of finitude represented by memento mori 
teaches us that the experience of absence has a say. Even if less rigorous than 
the word of philosophy, this word of faith offers an opening to the authen-
ticity of death, an authenticity synonymous with overcoming it.
22  See, for example, the paradoxical God of E. Cioran, in Nicolae Turcan, “Cioran et le 
Dieu des paradoxes,” trans. Mihaela-Gențiana Stănișor, Alkemie. Revue semestrielle de littéra-
ture et philosophie, no. 6 (2010).
23  Lacoste, Note sur le temps, chap. 31.
24  Mihail Turcan, “Ca și cum Dumnezeu nu ar exista. Despre transfigurarea prin credință 
la Pascal” [As if God did not exist. About transfiguration through faith in Pascal], Tabor XV, 
no. 1 (2021): 83.
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